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This paper presents a formalisation of pGCL in Isabelle/HOL. Using a shallow embedding, we
demonstrate close integration with existing automation support. We demonstrate the facility with
which the model can be extended to incorporate existing results, including those of the L4.verified
project. We motivate the applicability of the formalism to the mechanical verification of probabilistic
security properties, including the effectiveness of side-channel countermeasures in real systems.
1 Introduction
We present a new formalisation of the pGCL programming logic within Isabelle/HOL [14]. The motiva-
tion for this work is the desire for formal, mechanised verification of probabilistic security properties (in
particular, bounds on side-channel vulnerability) for real systems. We build on existing theoretical work
on pGCL [11], and present a complementary approach to the existing formalisation in HOL4 [8].
Our contribution is a shallow embedding of pGCL within Isabelle/HOL, using the unmodified real-
number type for probabilities, leading to excellent support for proof automation and easy extensibility
to tackle novel problems, and to integrate with existing results (including those of L4.verified [9]). We
demonstrate these by example.
The structure of the paper is as follows: We first motivate the need for probabilistic reasoning in
systems (Section 2), and in particular the need for probabilistic (Section 2.2) and refinement-sound (Sec-
tion 2.3) security properties. We then present our pGCL theory package (Section 3), giving a cursory
introduction to its syntax and underlying model (Section 3.1), and demonstrate the use of the package
(Section 3.2), giving examples of 3 styles of proof. We next provide more detail on the underlying im-
plementation (Section 4), touching on the specifics of the shallow embedding (Section 4.1), extending it
into novel contexts (Section 4.2), the lattice structure of the semantic models that underlie recursion (Sec-
tion 4.3), and finally the implementation of the VCG (Section 4.4). Surveying related work (Section 5),
we conclude by describing the ongoing efforts in applying the tool (Section 6).
2 The Case for Probabilistic Correctness
Recent work [9] has demonstrated the practicality of verifying the functional correctness of real sys-
tems. Functional correctness, however, covers only properties that are guaranteed to hold. This excludes
classes of properties relevant in practice, including certain execution-time and security guarantees. By
∗NICTA is funded by the Australian Government as represented by the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Econ-
omy and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence program.
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Figure 1: String compare (strcmp) execution time distribution
allowing security properties that only hold with some probability, we can give a more nuanced classifi-
cation of systems than that arising from a functional property such as noninterference [6].
2.1 Probabilistic Behaviour in Systems
In formal specification, it is convenient to treat a system as fully predictable, and make concrete truth
claims about its behaviour. Once implemented, while the system may be in principle predictable, the size
and complexity (and often under-specification) of the state space makes a full description impractical.
The usual approach in this case is to retreat to a probabilistic model of the system, informed by
benchmarking. That this is true is apparent on reading the evaluation section of a systems paper: While
the precise performance of a system is theoretically predictable and could thus be calculated without
empiricism, what we see are benchmarks and histograms. The tools of the evaluator are experiments and
statistics! This is a testament to the immense difficulty of precisely predicting performance. Once real
world phenomena intrude, as in networking, exact prediction becomes impossible, even in theory.
Moreover, there exist properties which can only be treated with statistical methods. If such properties
are critical for correctness, then a proof will, of necessity, involve probabilistic reasoning. Execution
time is an example. Figure 1 is representative, giving the response time distribution for the C strcmp
routine for a fixed secret and a varying guess1. Note that within the measurement precision (10ns) the
distribution is essentially continuous, and depends on a sensitive datum: the longest common prefix
between the secret and the guess. If we are concerned with security, this is a correctness-critical property
that is unavoidably probabilistic. This is a simple side-channel, vulnerable to a guessing attack.
2.2 Security Properties
As stated, our motivation is the verification of probabilistic security properties, given a concrete attack
model. Building on the above example, imagine that an adversary is supplying guesses in decreasing
order of probability, and updating this order based on observed response time. A possible security
property then, is that the adversary does not guess the true secret in fewer than, say, n attempts.
1This figure first appeared in a previous work [3], where it is discussed in more depth.
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For a functional security property, we would now calculate the set of initial states that guarantee that
our property will hold in the final state: its weakest precondition (wp). Security is assured by showing
that the initial state lies in this set.
In a probabilistic system, however, it could easily be the case that from any initial state, there is a
nonzero probability that the final state is insecure, even if the overall chance of this occurring is small.
This would be the case if the attacker guessed completely at random. The best we could then hope for is
to find the probability that the final state is secure.
What we need is a probabilistic analogue of the weakest precondition. Consider the functional weak-
est precondition as a {0,1}-valued function (identifying it with its selector). We then ask whether we
can define a [0,1]-valued function, that instead of answering “secure” or “not secure” for a state, answers
“secure with probability p”. We could then show that the system remains secure with probability ≥ p
by showing that the initial state lies in the set for which wp≥ p. In the probabilistic programming logic
pGCL of McIver & Morgan [11] we find just such an analogue.
2.3 Refinement and Security
The standard problem in applying refinement to security is in treating nondeterminism. Writing a ; ; b
for the sequential composition of programs a and b, and cud for a demonically nondeterministic choice
between c and d, consider the following fragment:
h := secret ; ; (l := 0u l := 1) where secret ∈ {0,1} .
Let h (high) be hidden, and l (low) be globally visible. We wish to formalise the intuitive security
property: ‘the value in l doesn’t reveal the value in h’. Writing av b for ‘b refines a’, taken to mean that
every trace of b is also a trace of a, the following is a valid refinement:
h := secret ; ; l := h ,
which clearly violates the security property. Any attempt to verify a property such as ∀sfinal. l 6= h for
this program fails due to such insecure refinements.2
For a property Q to survive refinement, writing ` for predicate entailment, we need that
av b
wp a Q ` wp b Q whence by transitivity,
av b P ` wp a Q
P ` wp b Q .
Under an appropriate model (e.g. wp (aub) P s = wp a P s∧wp b P s), these relations hold for the
above program and security predicate, but show the hopelessness of the case as:
∀s. ¬wp (h := secret ; ; (l := 0u l := 1)) (l 6= h) s .
In other words the weakest precondition of l 6= h, considered as a set, is empty, and thus the original
specification cannot satisfy the security property. Pessimistically, on any trace the program might set
l = h. It is critical to establish that a desired security property is preserved by refinement, in order that
such insecure specifications are exposed.
2With a state space of two, of course, such an anti-correlation would be just as insecure as l = h. In a large space however,
knowing l 6= h leaks very little information. We are not establishing that l and h are uncorrelated, rather that in a given trace
they did not happen to coincide. When we consider guessing attacks, this will be precisely the formulation we need: Whether
or not the attacker simply got lucky is irrelevant, as the system is still compromised.
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Our formalism of choice is pGCL, where we have a novel notion of entailment. We write3 PQ for
comparison defined pointwise i.e. ∀s. P s ≤ Q s. If P  Q, then P has a lower value in every state than
does Q. Write4 «P» for the boolean predicate P as real-valued function (an expectation):
«P» s = if P s then 1 else 0 noting that P ` Q↔ «P»  «Q»
Considering again the example of Section 2.2, we model a guessing attack on h as
(h := 0uh := 1) ; ; (l := 0 ⊕1/2 l := 1) , (1)
where the secret (h) is chosen nondeterministically, and the guess (l) randomly (a ⊕p b denotes proba-
bilistic choice between programs a and b, with probability p for a).
We have structural refinement rules, for example aubv a, and the following relations:
WP_REFINES
av b
wp a Q  wp b Q whence
av b P  wp a Q
P  wp b Q ,
which are the probabilistic equivalents of our refinement conditions. We have, therefore, that h := 0 ; ;
(l := 0 ⊕1/2 l := 1) is a refinement of Equation 1, but importantly, (h := 0u h := 1) ; ; l := h is not. In
contrast to demonic choice, probabilistic choice cannot be refined away.
A refinement in pGCL establishes a predicate with higher probability than does its specification.
Thus if we arrange our predicate on final states as ‘the system is secure’, and we are content with estab-
lishing the minimum probability with which it is established, refinement by definition can only increase
this probability. Our guessing-game model is thus refinement-sound in pGCL.
3 The pGCL Theory Package
To automate such reasoning, we present a shallow embedding of pGCL in Isabelle/HOL. With a few
noted exceptions, we preserve the syntax of McIver & Morgan. The advantage of our approach is the
ease with which we can apply the existing machinery of Isabelle/HOL to the underlying arithmetic. The
disadvantage is that we cannot appeal to the axioms of a stricter type, in particular Isabelle’s fixed-point
lemmas, which reside in the class of complete lattices. This is dealt with in detail in Section 4.
The language models imperative computation, extended with both nondeterministic and probabilistic
choice. The non-probabilistic component corresponds to Dijkstra’s guarded command language, GCL
[5]. Nondeterminism (by default) is demonic, with respect to the postcondition of a program: A demonic
choice minimises the likelihood of establishing the postcondition.
Sequential composition (; ;), demonic choice (u) and probabilistic choice ( ⊕p ) were introduced in
Section 2.3. The remainder consists of: Abort and Skip, representing failure and a null operation, re-
spectively; Apply, which embeds a state transformer; and the recursive primitive, µ .
3.1 The Expectation-Transformer Model
The intuitive interpretation of a program, its operational semantics, is as a probabilistic automaton. From
a given state, the program chooses the next randomly, with a probability depending on the state. The
program is thus a forward transformer, taking a distribution on initial states to one on final states.
3We differ in syntax, as the symbolV is not readily available within Isabelle
4Again we differ, as the established syntax, [·], clashes with lists.
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wp Abort R = λ s. 0 wp (a ; ; b) R = wp a (wp b R)
wp Skip R = R wp (a ⊕p b) R = λ s. p s×wp a R s+(1− p s)×wp b R s
wp (Apply f ) R = λ s. R ( f s) wp (aub)R = λ s. min (wp a R s) (wp b R s)
Figure 2: Structural wp rules.
For mechanisation, we are more interested in the axiomatic interpretation of a program: as a reverse
transformer. Here, the program maps a function on the final state to one on the initial state: a ‘real-
valued predicate’. These generalised predicates are the expectations of Section 2.3, and are the bounded,
nonnegative functions from the state space S, to R:
bounded_by b P≡ ∀s. P s≤ b bounded P≡ ∃b. bounded_by b P
nneg P≡ ∀s. 0≤ P s sound P≡ bounded P∧nneg P
The strict interpretation of non-recursive constructions is given in Figure 2. The liberal interpretation
differs only for Abort and µ , and is explained in Section 4.1. That the forward and reverse interpretations
are equivalent is established [11], although we have not mechanised the proof.
To see that this model produces the probabilistic weakest precondition demanded in Section 2, note
that the expectation «R» : S→ R, applied to final states, gives the probability that the predicate R holds.
This interpretation is preserved under transformation: wp prog «R» sinitial is the probability that R will
hold in the final state, if prog executes from sinitial. Equivalently, it is the current expected value of the
predicate on the final state: ∑sfinal P(sfinal|sinitial)×«R» sfinal, hence the term expectation.
A program is represented as a function from expectation to expectation: (S→ R)→ S→ R. The
function maps post-expectation to weakest pre-expectation. For a standard post-expectation, the embed-
ding of a predicate (e.g. «P»), this is the greatest lower bound on the likelihood of it holding, finally.
For our inference rules to apply, transformers must satisfy several healthiness properties, which
are slightly weaker than the standard versions [10]. We combine the treatment of strict transformers
(weakest precondition, giving total correctness) and liberal transformers (weakest liberal precondition,
giving partial correctness) by working in the union of their domains. This basic healthiness is defined as
the combination of feasibility, monotonicity and weak scaling:
feasible t ≡ ∀Pb. bounded_by b P∧nneg P→ bounded_by b (t P)∧nneg (t P)
mono_trans t ≡ ∀PQ. (sound P∧ sound Q∧P  Q)−→ (t P)  (t Q)
scaling t ≡ ∀Pcs. (sound P∧0 < c)−→ c× t P s = t (λ s. c×P s) s
Stronger results are established on-the-fly by appealing to one of several supplied rule-sets.
A well-defined program has healthy strict and liberal interpretations, related appropriately:
well_def a≡ healthy (wp a)∧healthy (wlp a)∧ (∀P. sound P−→ wp a P  wlp a P)
3.2 Reasoning with pGCL
The rules in Figure 2 evaluate the weakest pre-expectation of non-recursive program fragments struc-
turally. If the exponential growth of the term is not problematic, the simplifier can calculate it exactly.
We also show two other approaches supported by the package: Modular reasoning by structural decom-
position, and the verification condition generator (VCG). Examples are given in Isabelle proof script.
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hide≡ Apply (λ s. sLP := 1M)uApply (λ s. sLP := 2M)uApply (λ s. sLP := 3M)
guess≡ Apply (λ s. sLG := 1M) ⊕λ s. 1/3 (Apply (λ s. sLG := 2M) ⊕λ s. 1/2 Apply (λ s. sLG := 3M))
reveal≡
l
d ∈ (λ s. {1,2,3}−{P s,G s}). Apply (λ s. sLC := dM)
switch≡
l
d ∈ (λ s. {1,2,3}−{C s,G s}). Apply (λ s. sLG := dM)
monty s≡ hide ; ; guess ; ; reveal ; ; if s then switch else Skip
Figure 3: The Monty Hall game in pGCL
Consider Figure 3, a model of the Monty Hall problem [8, 15]. Briefly, the context is a game show:
A prize is hidden behind one of three doors (hide), of which the contestant then guesses one (guess). The
host then opens a door other than the one the contestant has chosen (reveal), showing that it does not
hide the prize. The contestant now has a choice: to switch to the unopened door (switch), or to stick to
the original (Skip). Is the contestant better off switching?
Figure 3 introduces a new primitive: demonic choice over a set:
l
x ∈ {a,b, . . .}. p x≡ p au p bu . . . wp
(l
x ∈ S. p x
)
R s = inf {wp (p x) R s |x ∈ S s}
The ability to extend the language in this way is a benefit of the shallow embedding. We will return to
this point in Section 4.2.
We first define the victory condition for the game, whence the least probability of the contestant
winning, over all choices by the (demonic) host, and from a given starting state s, is then given by the
weakest precondition:
win g≡ (G g = P g) Pmin(win) = wp (monty switch) «win» s
Proof by unfolding When switch is false, we solve by explicitly unfolding the rules in Figure 2. This
approach was demonstrated by Hurd et. al. [8] As expected, the contestant has a 1/3 chance of success:
lemma wp_monty_noswitch: "λ s. 1/3  wp (monty false) «wins»"
unfolding monty_def hide_def guess_def reveal_def switch_def
by(simp add:wp_eval insert_Diff_if)
Proof by decomposition If switch is true the state space grows dramatically, and such a straightforward
proof becomes computationally expensive, although it is still just possible in this case. To scale to still
larger examples, we must employ modular reasoning. Fortunately, weakest preconditions in pGCL admit
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composition rules very similar to their counterparts for GCL:
WP_STRENGTHEN_POST
P  wp p Q Q  R healthy (wp p) sound Q sound R
P  wp p R
WP_SEQ
Q  wp b R P  wp a Q healthy (wp a) healthy (wp b) sound Q sound R
P  wp (a ; ; b) R
The healthiness and soundness obligations result from the shallow embedding. The rules are otherwise
identical. To integrate with Isabelle’s calculational reasoner [1], we define probabilistic Hoare triples:
WP_VALIDI
P  wp a Q
{P} a {Q}
WP_VALIDD
{P} a {Q}
P  wp a Q
VALID_SEQ
{P} a {Q} {Q} b {R} healthy (wp a) healthy (wp b) sound Q sound R
{P} a ; ; b {R}
Note that VALID_SEQ is simply the composition of WP_COMPOSE with WP_VALIDI and WP_VALIDD.
We need one final rule, peculiar to pGCL, which illustrates the real-valued nature of expectations:
WP_SCALE
P  wp a Q healthy (wp a) sound Q 0 < c
(λ s. c×P s)  wp a (λ s. c×Q s)
This follows from the healthiness of the transformer, and allows us to scale the pre- and post-expectations
such that the latter ‘fits under’ some target. To illustrate, consider the ‘obvious’ specification of hide:
λ s. 1  wp hide «λ s. P s ∈ {1,2,3}» (2)
This states that with probability 1, the prize ends up behind door 1, 2 or 3. In evaluating our preconditions
stepwise, however, we find that the weakest precondition of the remainder of the program is in fact:
λ s. 2/3×«λ s. P s ∈ {1,2,3}» s .
Applying rule WP_SCALE to Equation 2 we derive a scaled rule:
λ s. 2/3  wp hide (λ s. 2/3×«λ s. P s ∈ {1,2,3}» s) .
Using this, we see that the probability of success if the contestant switches is at least5 2/3:
declare valid_Seq[trans]
lemma wp_monty_switch_modular: "λ s. 2/3  wp (monty true) «wins»"
proof(rule wp_validD)
note wp_validI[OF wp_scale, OF wp_hide, simplified]
also note wp_validI[OF wp_guess]
also note wp_validI[OF wp_reveal]
also note wp_validI[OF wp_switch]
finally show "λ s. 2/3  wp (monty true) «wins»"
unfolding monty_def by(simp add:healthy_intros sound_intros monty_healthy)
qed
5In fact it is exactly 2/3, but our object is to demonstrate an entailment proof. In more complicated situations, calculating
the exact pre-expectation is impractical.
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a ; ; b≡ λab. (a ab)◦ (b ab) Abort≡ λabP. if ab then λ s. 0 else λ s. bound_of P
Embed f ≡ λab. f µx. prog x≡ λab. if ab then lfp_trans (λ t. prog (Embed t) ab)
else gfp_trans (λ t. prog (Embed t) ab)
wp a≡ a True wlp a≡ a False
Figure 4: The underlying definitions of selected primitives
As mentioned, we take advantage of the calculational reasoning facility of Isabelle. The intermediate
Hoare triples are automatically derived, by applying VALID_SEQ to the previous relation and the supplied
specification. Finally, we again discharge all side-conditions using the simplifier.
Proof by VCG Finally, we can pass the component specifications to our verification condition genera-
tor (VCG), which follows a similar strategy to the above, automatically matching the appropriate rule to
the goal. The VCG leaves an inequality between the target pre-expectation and that calculated internally
(generally not the weakest). In this case, the final goal is trivial enough to be discharged internally.
lemmas scaled_hide = wp_scale[OF wp_hide, simplified]
declare scaled_hide[wp] wp_guess[wp] wp_reveal[wp] wp_guess[wp]
declare healthy_wp_hide[health] healthy_wp_guess[health]
healthy_wp_reveal[health] healthy_wp_switch[health]
lemma wp_monty_switch_vcg: "λ s. 2/3  wp (monty true) «wins»"
unfolding monty_def by(simp,pvcg)
3.3 Loops and Recursion
Recursive programs cannot be evaluated by unfolding. The treatment of recursion in pGCL is well
developed, and we have incorporated some of this work, specifically regarding loops. Our treatment is
at an early stage of development, but we already provide several useful rules, including this, which is a
specialisation of lemma 7.3.1 of McIver & Morgan [11], and gives the correctness condition for standard
post-expectations on loops which terminate6 with probability 1:
WP_LOOP
well_def (wp body) sub_distrib (do G→ body) (λ s. «G» s×«I» s)  wp body «I»
«I»&&wp (do G→ body) (λ s.1)  wp (do G→ body) (λ s.«G»×«I») (3)
4 Implementation and Extensions
We now expand on some details of the implementation, and its extensions.
4.1 Implementing wp and wlp
Figure 4 details the implementation of several primitives, together with the definitions of wp and wlp.
Programs are represented as their associated transformer, parameterised by the treatment of Abort (the
6A strictly weaker condition than terminating along all paths: Non-terminating traces with probability 0 are acceptable.
Consider flipping a coin until it shows heads: The only non-terminating path (flipping tails forever) has probability 0.
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type_synonym (σ ,α) nondet_monad = σ ⇒ (α×σ) set×bool
{P} f{Q} ≡ ∀s. P s−→ (∀(r,s′) ∈ fst ( f s). Q r s′)
no_fail P m≡ ∀s. P s−→¬(snd (m s))
Exec :: (σ ,α) nondet_monad⇒ σ prog
Exec M ≡ λab R s.
let (SA, f ) = M s in Run the monad
if f then Abort ab R s Fail is Abort
else if SA = {} then (bound_of R) Stuck is Success
else let S = snd`SA in Ignore result
glb (R `S) Infimum over states
Figure 5: The L4.verified non-deterministic monad in Isabelle
parameter ab), giving either strict or liberal semantics. Only Abort and µ change their behaviour between
wp and wlp: The former gives either failure (λPs. 0) or success (λPs. bound_of P), whereas the latter
is the least or the greatest fixed point, respectively. All others, as for (; ;), and simply pass ab inward.
4.2 Consequences of a Shallow Embedding
The very shallow embedding used has two important consequences, the first of which is negative. The
healthiness of transformers, and soundness of expectations, must be explicitly carried as assumptions. A
deeper embedding [8] might restrict to the type of healthy transformers, in which case these would be
satisfied by the type axioms.
We avoid such an embedding to reuse as much of the mechanisation within Isabelle/HOL as possible.
Reasoning within a fresh type requires lifting (and modifying) all necessary rules. The burden of dis-
charging our side-conditions is, moreover, not high. For any primitively constructed program, healthiness
follows by invoking the simplifier with the appropriate lemmas.
The positive consequence of an extremely shallow embedding is the ease with which it can be ex-
tended. We have already seen an example: the definition of demonic choice from a set (following a
standard abbreviation [11]). To do so, one need only supply weakest-precondition (and weakest-liberal-
precondition) rules, rules to infer healthiness and (optionally) rules for proof decomposition.
Interestingly, it is not necessary to show that the new primitive is sound, that is, produces a healthy
transformer for all inputs. It is merely necessary that the supplied rules show healthiness for just those
cases in which it is actually used. Set demonic choice is just such a partially sound primitive: Healthiness
does not generally hold for infinite sets. Applied here to finite sets, the given rules establish healthiness.
As a further example, we embed the non-deterministic monad at the heart of the L4.verified proof.
The existing definition, Figure 5, is as a function from states (σ ) to a set of result (α), state pairs. The
extra result is the failure flag, used to explicitly signal failure. This was added to ensure that termination
is preserved under refinement, as described elsewhere [4]. We embed as follows: Stuck (no successor
states) is success, for compatibility with our infimum-over-alternatives interpretation; Explicit failure is
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Abort, which in turn is either success or failure under wlp or wp, respectively. We lift results as follows:
WP_EXEC
{P} prog {λ r s. Q s} no_fail P prog ∃s. P s
«P» ` wp prog «Q»
WLP_EXEC
{P} prog {λ r s. Q s} ∃s. P s
«P» ` wlp prog «Q»
4.3 Fixed Points and the Lattice Structure of Expectations and Transformers
Handling recursion means reasoning about fixed points. In this case, we need both least and greatest,
on expectations and on transformers. Due to the shallow embedding, we cannot appeal to the existing
fixed point results, which are phrased on a complete lattice. Neither the underlying type for expectations
(S→ R) or for transformers ((S→ R)→ S→ R) can be so instantiated, due to the lack of both top and
bottom elements. The solution in each case is different.
Sound expectations have an obvious bottom element, λ s. 0, but there is no universal upper bound.
We only require that there exists a bound for any given expectation. There need not exist any bound on
an arbitrary set of sound expectations. For example, with S = N, consider the set
{(λ s. if s = n then n else 0) : n ∈ N} .
Each expectation is bounded (by n) and non-negative, yet the least upper bound, λ s. s, is unbounded.
We need a surrogate for the top element. To illustrate, take our definition for greatest fixed point:
gfp_in f S≡ if ∃x ∈ S. x≤ f x then lub {x ∈ S. x≤ f x} else lowerbound S
The lower bound is easy (λ s. 0), but in order to find the least upper bound, we first need some upper
bound. In a complete lattice, this is the top element. Instead, we appeal to feasibility:
bound_of ((µx. f x) P)≤ bound_of P , and thus (µx. f x) P≤ λ s. bound_of P .
It is therefore sufficient to consider fixed points that are weakly bounded by P:
weakly_bounded_by P≡ {Q. sound Q∧bound_of Q≤ bound_of P}
Finally, we establish the standard fixed-point results parameterised by P. For example:
GFP_IN_UNFOLD
healthy t
gfp_in t (weakly_bounded_by P) = t (gfp_in t (weakly_bounded_by P))
The case of transformers is simpler, again due to feasibility:
t P s≤ bound_of P and thus t ≤ λP s. bound_of P
Thus we have a top element, and establish a complete lattice by means of a quotient:
le_trans t u≡ ∀P. sound P→ t P≤ u P equiv_trans t u≡ le_trans t u∧ le_trans u t
htrans_rel t u≡ healthy t ∧healthy u∧ equiv_trans t u
quotient_type σ trans = (σ → R)→ σ → R/partial : htrans_rel
Using the induced homomorphism, we draw back the standard results:
GFP_TRANS_UNFOLD
∧t. healthy t ` healthy (T t) ∧t u. [healthy t;healthy u; le_trans t u] ` le_trans (T t) (T u)
equiv_trans (gfp_trans T ) (T (gfp_trans T ))
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4.4 The Verification Condition Generator
The VCG tactic, pvcg, is simple but nonetheless capable of handling Figure 3. It alternates applying an
entailment rule, and attempting to discharge side-goals using internal and user-supplied rules.
The user supplies specifications as proved entailment rules, tagged with [wp], and healthiness rules,
tagged with [health]. Internal rules are tagged [wp_core]. The VCG selects rules as follows:
1. User-supplied rules, as written.
2. User-supplied rules, with a strengthened postcondition: wp_strengthen_post[OF rule]. This
leaves a side-goal that the postcondition of the supplied rule entails the strengthened version.
3. Internal rules.
A user-supplied rule will override an internal rule, and may refer directly to a compound structure e.g. P
wp (a ; ;b) Q. The given rule will be used rather than unfolding the composition. If no user rule is found,
the VCG will proceed using its internal rules, calculating the exact weakest precondition by unfolding.
5 Related Work
The mechanisations of many existing programming logic formalisations have been presented, in Isabelle
and in other theorem provers [4, 7, 12, 13]. Relative to these, the novelty of this work is in the treatment
of probabilistic programs and properties, through pGCL.
A previous formalisation of pGCL, in the HOL4 theorem prover, was presented by Hurd et. al. [8],
whence we have adapted our worked example (Monty Hall). Celiku & McIver [2], working from this
same formalisation, developed an approach to analysing the execution time of probabilistic algorithms,
presenting a mechanised proof of the self-stabilisation time for Herman’s ring. We have presented a
novel approach to formalising the same underlying logic. By prioritising the reuse of existing theories
in Isabelle/HOL [14], in particular by defining expectations using the standard real type by means of our
quotient and pullback technique, we achieve excellent automation and integration with existing work,
notably L4.verified [9].
6 Applications & Ongoing Work
This formalisation was developed to assist in the verification of high-assurance component systems.
Our principal application is the verification of probabilistic security properties, of the sort established
in Section 2. Having established that a guessing-attack based measure is refinement-sound, we plan to
formally establish bounds on vulnerability due to guessing attacks involving side-channel leakage.
The fact that we can embed the nondeterministic monad used in the L4.verified proof is significant,
as it means that we can appeal directly to that project’s top-level theorem in establishing a probabilistic
result on seL4 (the microkernel in question). An attractive target is a randomised scheduler: In seL4, as
in many kernels, the scheduler is a small component, called at the top level after all other state-modifying
code has executed. We could thus appeal to the existing, unmodified, proof to establish the soundness of
the transformation and then, lifting the result via the above construction, establish a probabilistic result
on the system including the scheduler. As randomised scheduling is a common approach to side-channel
mitigation, this is a promising approach to achieving our stated goal of formally establishing side-channel
bounds in real systems.
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